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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
 The States of New Jersey and New York agreed 
more than half a century ago to enter into the Waterfront 
Commission Compact.  More recently, New Jersey 
enacted legislation to withdraw from the Compact.  To 
prevent this unilateral termination, the Waterfront 
Commission sued the Governor of New Jersey in federal 
court.  But because New Jersey is the real, substantial 
party in interest, its immunity should have barred the 
District Court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction.  
Accordingly, this case must be dismissed. 
I 
A 
By the mid-twentieth century, New York Harbor 
was rife with corruption, particularly in waterfront hiring 
practices.  See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 147–48 
(1960) (plurality opinion); N.Y. Shipping Ass’n v. 




49 (3d Cir. 2016).  After studying the problems created by 
corrupt practices, representatives of New Jersey and New 
York prepared remedial legislation, which each State 
enacted in 1953.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-1 et seq. 
(repealed 2018); N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 9801 et seq.  
Because the reciprocal statutes collectively function as an 
agreement between the States, Congress consented to the 
formation of the Waterfront Commission Compact, 
consistent with the Compacts Clause in Article I, § 10, of 
the U.S. Constitution.1  Act of Aug. 12, 1953, Pub. L. No. 
83-252, 67 Stat. 541, 541.   
The Compact reformed waterfront hiring practices 
by, inter alia, introducing registration and licensing 
requirements and channeling hiring through designated 
centers.  E.g., N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 9812, 9827, 9853.  
To implement such reforms, the Compact also established 
the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 
§§ 9807, 9810, and authorized the Commission to fund its 
operations by levying assessments on employers, § 9858.2  
 
1 Article I, § 10, cl. 3, provides in pertinent part that “[n]o 
State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another State.” 
2 Although the States could designate funding for the 
Commission (and the Commission may receive financial 
support from “federal grants or otherwise”), the Compact 





As the decades passed, most of the Harbor 
workforce shifted from New York to New Jersey, where 
deepwater berths better accommodated the modern trend 
toward containerized shipping.  Such developments 
redounded to the benefit of New Jersey’s economy.  
Eventually, the New Jersey legislature came to see the 
Commission as “over-regulat[ing] the businesses at the 
port in an effort to justify its existence,” which made the 
Commission “an impediment to future job growth and 
prosperity at the port.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-229. 
New Jersey repeatedly tried to cabin the 
Commission’s powers, and even to withdraw from the 
Compact entirely.  Those efforts came to fruition at the end 
of Governor Chris Christie’s term in office, when he 
signed into law Chapter 324.  Act of Jan. 16, 2018, 2017 
N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 324 (codified at, e.g., N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 32:23-229 to -230).  That chapter immediately 
repealed the New Jersey legislation that had contributed to 
the formation of the Compact.  Ch. 324, §§ 33–34 (citing 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-1 et seq.). 
 
employer assessments.  N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 9856, 
9858.  In fact, the Commission’s funding allegedly 




But Chapter 324 set out additional steps intended to 
further the State’s withdrawal from the Compact.  It 
required the New Jersey Governor to notify Congress, the 
Governor of New York, and the Commission of the 
“intention to withdraw.”  § 2.a.  That notification would 
initiate a ninety-day countdown to the “transfer date” 
when the Compact and the Commission would be 
“dissolved.”  §§ 3, 31.  Thereafter, the New Jersey 
Division of State Police would assume the Commission’s 
law enforcement functions on the New Jersey side of the 
Harbor.  See §§ 1.d, 4.b, 34.   
C 
The day after the outgoing Governor signed Chapter 
324, the Commission filed suit in federal district court 
against New Jersey Governor Philip Murphy in his official 
capacity.3  The one-count Complaint sought two forms of 
relief: a declaration that Chapter 324 violated the Compact 
and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and an 
injunction against its enforcement.  The District Court 
permitted the New Jersey Senate, Senate President, 
General Assembly, and Assembly Speaker (collectively, 
the “Legislature”) to intervene in defense of Chapter 324. 
 
3 The parties disagree as to whether this suit was properly 
filed in the Commission’s name.  We need not resolve that 




The Commission filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the Governor from effectuating 
withdrawal, while the Governor and Legislature moved 
for dismissal.  The District Court denied dismissal and 
granted the injunction.  Nearly a year later, the Court 
granted the Commission’s motion for summary judgment 
and denied the separate motions of the Governor and the 
Legislature. 
In these consolidated appeals, the Governor and 
Legislature challenge the District Court’s orders denying 
dismissal, granting an injunction, denying them summary 
judgment, and granting summary judgment to the 
Commission.4  Briefing included amicus curiae filings by 
the New York Shipping Association (NYSA) in support of 
the Governor and Legislature, and the Columbia River 






4 We do not reach issues implicated in challenges by the 
Governor and Legislature to “all other orders and rulings 




The District Court had federal-question jurisdiction 
over this dispute because the Complaint invoked the 
Supremacy Clause and the Compact.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331; Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Elizabeth-
Newark Shipping, Inc., 164 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(observing that Congressional consent enshrined the 
Compact in federal law).  But that jurisdiction does not 
extend to any claim barred by state sovereign immunity.  
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 
98, 119–21 (1984). 
In denying the Governor’s motion to dismiss, the 
District Court rejected the “suggest[ion]” that sovereign 
immunity applied to the Governor in this case.  Waterfront 
Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor v. Murphy, No. 18-650 (SDW) 
(LDW), 2018 WL 2455927, at *4 (D.N.J. June 1, 2018).  
We have plenary authority to determine whether sovereign 
immunity deprived the District Court of jurisdiction.5  28 
 
5 Although the District Court did not revisit the sovereign 
immunity issue at summary judgment, the Legislature and 
amicus NYSA pursue that issue on appeal as a 
jurisdictional matter.  We have jurisdiction over an appeal 
of an order granting summary judgment to address an 
underlying issue going to the District Court’s jurisdiction.  
See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.–Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 
502–03 (3d Cir. 2001) (examining denial of sovereign 
immunity on appeal of summary judgment); cf. Edelman 




U.S.C. § 1291; In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 938 F.3d 96, 
103 (3d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, No. 19-1039 
(Feb. 18, 2020).   
III 
State sovereign immunity dates back to our 
Nation’s Founding, and is deeply rooted in English law.  
See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 
1493–94 (2019); 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on 
the Laws of England 234–35 (1765).  Assurances that 
States would remain immune from federal suit—absent 
their consent—were instrumental in securing sufficient 
support for the Constitution’s adoption.  Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 & n.9 (1974).  Although the 
Eleventh Amendment expressly protects a State from 
federal suits by citizens of another State or country,6 case 
law recognizes that the actual scope of immunity extends 
beyond the Amendment’s text.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 727–28 (1999).  As a rule, “federal courts may not 
 
Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the 
nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised 
in the trial court”).   
6 “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 




entertain a private person’s suit against a State” unless the 
State has waived its immunity or Congress has permissibly 
abrogated it.  Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 
563 U.S. 247, 253–54 (2011) [hereinafter VOPA].  
An “important limit” to that rule allows federal suits 
against state officials in certain circumstances.  Id. at 254–
55.  Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a state official is 
“stripped of his official or representative character” and 
thereby deprived of the State’s immunity, Ex parte Young, 
209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908), when he commits an 
“ongoing violation of federal law.”  VOPA, 563 U.S. at 
254–55 (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n 
of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).  A person who is 
aggrieved may therefore seek prospective relief by suing 
him in his official capacity.  See id.  But Ex parte Young’s 
“authority-stripping theory . . . is a fiction that has been 
narrowly construed.”  Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 114 n.25.  Ex 
parte Young applies only to the “precise situation” of “a 
federal court command[ing] a state official to do nothing 
more than refrain from violating federal law.”  VOPA, 563 
U.S. at 255.   
Consistent with this narrow construction of Ex parte 
Young, the doctrine “does not apply ‘when the state is the 
real, substantial party in interest.’”  Id. (quoting 
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101).  Courts determine whether 
“relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact 




“operate against” the sovereign.  Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 
101 (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963) 
(per curiam)).  In other words, we examine “the effect of 
the relief sought.”  Id. at 107.  If such relief would operate 
against the State, then we forego the fiction of Ex parte 
Young in favor of the bedrock principle of state sovereign 
immunity. 
The Supreme Court has been “willing to police 
abuses of the [Ex parte Young] doctrine that threaten to 
evade sovereign immunity” because the relief would 
operate against the State.  VOPA, 563 U.S. at 256.  A State 
is generally the real, substantial party in interest if the 
“judgment sought would expend itself on the public 
treasury or domain, or interfere with public 
administration,” id. at 255 (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 
101 n.11) (internal quotation marks omitted), or if relief 
consists of “an injunction requiring the payment of funds 
from the State’s treasury, or an order for specific 
performance of a State’s contract,” id. at 256–57 (citation 
omitted) (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666–67; In re Ayers, 
123 U.S. 443 (1887)).7   
 
7 Even if the relief would affect the State’s treasury, the 
State may not be the real, substantial party in interest if the 
effect on the public fisc is merely “ancillary” to 
permissible prospective relief, as was the case in Ex parte 




The Court has concluded that the sovereign was the 
real, substantial party in interest in suits nominally against 
officials where relief would effectively force the 
restructuring of state mental health care at the State’s 
expense, see Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 93, 101 & n.11, 107; 
confer money damages for a State’s disability benefit 
processing deficiencies, see Edelman, 415 U.S. at 655–56, 
668–69; enjoin activity that would breach a State’s 
contract, see In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 502–03, 507; require 
substantial, unbudgeted expansion of a federal water 
project, see Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 610–11, 616, 
620–21 (1963);8 or quiet title to, and preclude state control 
of, territory within the State’s regulatory jurisdiction, see 
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281–
82, 287–88 (1997) (permitting suit would be “as intrusive 
 
8 Dugan reached this conclusion as to claims against 
federal officials, but Pennhurst imported Dugan’s 
principles into an Ex parte Young suit against state 
officials.  See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 n.11 (citing 
Dugan, 372 U.S. at 620); see also Gordon, 373 U.S. at 58 
(suit against federal official was effectively against United 
States because prospective relief would, inter alia, “affect 
the public administration of government agencies” 




as almost any conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in 
its Treasury”).9   
IV 
Here, the Commission does not directly challenge 
the general rule of state sovereign immunity.  It simply 
chose not to name the State of New Jersey as a defendant 
in its Complaint.  By naming the Governor instead, the 
Commission attempts to bring this case within the reach of 
Ex parte Young.  That attempt is unavailing.  Because the 
relief nominally sought from the Governor in this case 
would operate against the State itself, New Jersey is the 
real, substantial party in interest.10 
 
9 By contrast, the sovereign was not the real, substantial 
party in interest in suits against state officials to prevent 
enforcement of a State’s railroad rate regulation, see Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. at 129–31, 159–60; secure access 
to a State’s mental hospital records, see VOPA, 563 U.S. 
at 252, 256–57; or, as this Court decided, alter a state-
approved agreement between competitors, see MCI 
Telecomm., 271 F.3d at 514–15. 
 
10 Although we agree with the Legislature on this 
conclusion, we do not embrace the grounds upon which it 
argues for such an outcome.  The Legislature contends that 
the Governor’s enforcement duty was not sufficiently 





The Commission seeks a judgment that “would 
expend itself on the public treasury or domain.”  VOPA, 
563 U.S. at 255 (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 n.11).   
 
Indeed, Ex parte Young suggests that we consider the 
nature of the state officer’s duty to enforce a challenged 
law.  See 209 U.S. at 157, 161.  But we think the Governor 
has sufficiently specific statutory obligations that an Ex 
parte Young claim cannot be precluded on that basis.   
Chapter 324 expressly requires the Governor to 
notify Congress, the New York Governor, and the 
Commission of New Jersey’s impending withdrawal—
which triggers the ninety-day countdown to 
consummation—and then tell the Legislature’s presiding 
officers that he did so.  §§ 2, 31.  The Complaint objects 
to the Governor’s “taking any action to implement or 
enforce” Chapter 324 and identifies the portion of the 
Governor’s obligations that triggers the withdrawal 
countdown.  J.A. 55–56, 67–68.  For this reason, we are 
not persuaded we should dismiss on grounds that the suit 
alleges insufficiently specific obligations to make out an 
Ex parte Young claim.  Cf. Constitution Party of Pa. v. 
Cortes, 824 F.3d 386, 396 (3d Cir. 2016) (recognizing 




The Complaint is frank in its recitation of the 
expected financial effects of Chapter 324 on the 
Commission: 
[Chapter 324] would take away the 
Commission’s primary revenue stream. . . . 
[T]he Commission is not funded with tax 
dollars, and its budget derives entirely from 
the assessments that it collects from Port 
employers.  Inasmuch as the vast majority of 
commercial Port operations occurs on the 
New Jersey side, [Chapter 324] – which 
purports to remove the Commission’s 
authority to assess fees on New Jersey 
employers – will virtually eliminate the 
Commission’s budget. 
J.A. 69–70.   
The Commission’s dim prognosis is consistent with 
the text of Chapter 324.  Whereas the Commission has 
been collecting assessments on work within New Jersey, 
Chapter 324 tabs those assessments for the budget of the 
New Jersey Division of State Police.  See § 25.b.  The 
result will be that those assessments will now flow into 
New Jersey’s coffers: “Each employer shall pay to the 
State Treasurer, for placement within the General Fund, an 
assessment . . . .”  Id.; see also § 26.a(10) (“All funds of 
the division received as payment of any assessment or 




Treasurer.”).  The same goes for the Commission’s current 
liquid assets.  Chapter 324 requires the Commission to 
deposit “the funds of the commission applicable to this 
State . . . into the custody of the State Treasurer.”  § 4.b(2).  
At bottom, Chapter 324 redirects the Commission’s 
present and anticipated future funding from New Jersey 
employers into New Jersey’s treasury. 
This suit is no mere attempt to compel or forestall a 
state official’s actions consistent with Ex parte Young’s 
holding.  Rather, when we compare the Commission’s 
allegations about Chapter 324 with the chapter’s text, we 
observe that the Commission attempts to pry back its 
authority to assess employers, in direct conflict with 
Chapter 324’s provisions.  On these facts, where a 
judgment for the Commission would divert state treasury 
funding and thereby operate against the State,11 we 
 
11 Even if the effect on New Jersey’s treasury can be 
deemed ancillary to permissible prospective relief, see 
supra note 7, this suit falls beyond Ex parte Young’s 
bounds for the independent reason that it effectively seeks 
specific performance of the Compact. 
Separately, we do not view our fact-specific holding 
to create tension with cases allowing suits to enjoin future 
taxation to proceed under Ex parte Young.  E.g., CSX 
Transp., Inc. v. Bd. of Pub. Works of W. Va., 138 F.3d 537, 
541–43 (4th Cir. 1998) (determining whether relief sought 




conclude that New Jersey is the real, substantial party in 
interest.  
B 
We reach the same outcome when considering this 
suit from a different angle: the Commission effectively 
seeks “specific performance of a State’s contract.”  VOPA, 
563 U.S. at 257.   
Like other interstate compacts, the Waterfront 
Commission Compact is a contract subject to our 
construction.  Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 
U.S. 614, 628 (2013).  Our inquiry begins with the 
Compact’s express terms, id., and we need go no further.  
Each State “deemed” the Compact’s regulation of the 
waterfront “an exercise of the police power of the two 
states for the protection of the public safety, welfare, 
prosperity, health, peace and living conditions of the 
people of the two states.”  N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 9805.  
And the Commission is empowered to “administer and 
enforce” the Compact’s regulations.  § 9810.  New 
 
whether State was real, substantial party in interest).  We 
have no occasion to take a position on that issue.  Here we 
are faced with a suit seeking prospective relief that 
unquestionably operates against the State itself: The 
Commission has no quibble with the assessments 
continuing but wants to keep the revenue coming to its 




Jersey’s contractual performance therefore consists 
primarily of permitting the Commission to carry out 
regulation of hiring on the New Jersey side of the Harbor 
that otherwise falls within the State’s police powers.   
By enacting Chapter 324, the State of New Jersey 
has chosen to discontinue its performance of the Compact 
and to resume the full exercise of its police powers on its 
own side of the Harbor.  Yet the Complaint seeks 
invalidation of Chapter 324.  Granting this relief would 
compel New Jersey to continue to abide by the terms of an 
agreement it has decided to renounce.  Such relief 
tantamount to specific performance would operate against 
the State itself, demonstrating that New Jersey is the real, 
substantial party in interest. 
*** 
We are convinced that this suit seeks relief beyond 
the Ex parte Young doctrine’s narrow confines by asking 
that we invalidate Chapter 324.  Invalidation would 
necessarily have an adverse impact on the State of New 
Jersey’s treasury and compel the State to perform 
consistent with the Compact.12  Because such relief would 
 
12 Cf. MSA Realty Corp. v. Illinois, 990 F.2d 288, 289–90, 
295 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting Ex parte Young claim that 




operate against New Jersey as the real, substantial party in 
interest, the State is entitled to the protection of sovereign 
immunity.13  Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to address 
the other threshold concerns raised by the Governor and 
Legislature, nor can we reach the merits of New Jersey’s 
anticipated withdrawal from the Compact.    
V 
 Because this suit impinges on the State of New 
Jersey’s sovereignty, thereby depriving the District Court 
of jurisdiction, we will vacate the order granting summary 
judgment to the Commission, reverse the order denying 
the Governor’s motion to dismiss, and vacate that order in 
all other respects.  The case will be remanded for 
dismissal. 
 
promising return of state sales taxes to participating 
municipalities).   
13 New Jersey has not waived its immunity from this suit, 
nor has Congress abrogated it.  See VOPA, 563 U.S. at 
253–54. 
